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Philosophy of Psychology
Philosophy of Science
1989 Ph.D. History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh
1988 M.A. History and Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh
1981-1983 A.B. Philosophy, University of Chicago
1979-1981 Case Western Reserve University
Philosophy of Neuroscience, Philosophy of Psychology
- The Bounds of Cognition. (2008) (With Fred Adams) Boston, MA: Blackwell Publishers.
- The Systematicity Arguments. (2003). Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground. (Co-edited with Carl Gillett). (2016) London: Palgrave-Macmillan.
- What is 4E Cognition? (2018) In Albert Newen, Leon de Bruin & Gallagher Shaun (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition, Oxford: Oxford University Press. (pp. 117-26)
- Turing-equivalent computation at the "conception" of cognitive science. (2018). In Sprevak, M., and Colombo, M. (eds.) Invited contribution for the Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind. (pp. 65-75).
Is Perceiving Bodily Action? (2018). Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, https://doi.org/10.1007/s11097-018-9592-9
Multiple Realization and Multiple “Ways” of Realization: A Progress Report. (2017) Studies in History and Philosophy of Science. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2017.11.005
Extended Cognition, Trust and Glue, and Knowledge. (2108) Invited contribution to Carter, J. A., Clark, A., Kallestrup, J., Palermos, S. O., and Pritchard, D. (Eds.) Extended Epistemology, Oxford University Press. (pp. 64-78).
Multiple realization, autonomy, and integration. Invited contribution to Explanation and Integration in the Mind and Brain Sciences. edited by David M. Kaplan. (2018)
Cognition and Behavior. (2017) Synthese, 194, pp. 4269–4288. Invited contribution to a special issue, edited by Cameron Buckner and Ellen Fridland, on “What is Cognition?” DOI: 10.1007/s11229-014-0645-5
Compositional Explanation: Dimensioned Realization, New Mechanism, and Ground, (2016). In Aizawa, K., and Gillett, C., (eds.) Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground. Palgrave-Macmillan. (pp. 75-90)
Introduction: Vertical Relations in Science, Philosophy, and the World: Understanding the New Debates over Verticality. (with Carl Gillett) (2016). In Aizawa, K., and Gillett, C., (eds.) Scientific Composition and Metaphysical Ground. Palgrave-Macmillan. (pp. 1-38)
“Enactive, Extended, Embodied, and Embedded Cognition." In McLaughlin, Brian P., editor. Philosophy: Mind. Macmillan Interdisciplinary Handbooks: Philosophy series. Farmington Hills, MI: Macmillan Reference USA/Gale, a Cengage Company, 2016. (pp. 395-416).
Desafio empírico a teorias dinâmicas de percepção e emoção. (2015). In Coelho, J., and Broens, M. (eds.) Encontro Com As Ciências Cognitivas: Cognição, Emoção, E Ação. Cultura Acadêmica: São Paulo, Brazil
Realization, Reduction and Emergence (2015). (with Carl Gillett). Invited contribution J. Clausen, and N. Levy (eds.), Springer Handbook on Neuroethics. New York, NY: Springer. (pp. 49-62).
“What is this Cognition that is Supposed to be Embodied?” (2014). Philosophical Psychology. DOI: 10.1080/09515089.2013.875280
The Enactivist Revolution. (2014). Invited contribution to Enactivism: Arguments & Applications, a special issue of AVANT, Vol. V, No. 2/2014, ISSN: 2082-6710 avant.edu.pl/en, DOI: 10.12849/50202014.0109.0002 (Editors of the Issue: Tomasz Komendziński, Przemysław Nowakowski, Witold Wachowski)
Extended Cognition. (2014). Invited contribution to Lawrence Shapiro (Ed.) Routledge Handbook on Embodied Cognition. New York, NY: Routledge. (pp. 31-8).
Editors’ introduction to “The Material Basis of Cognition,” (2013). Minds and Machines, 23(3), 277-86. doi: 10.1007/s11023-013-9312-8.
Multiple Realizability by Compensatory Differences. (2013). European Journal for Philosophy of Science. Volume 3, Issue 1, pp. 69-86. DOI: 10.1007/s13194-012-0058-6
“Warren McCulloch’s Turn to Cybernetics: What Walter Pitts Contributed” (2012). Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, 37(3), pp. 206-17. Invited contribution to a special issue of Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, edited by Tara Abraham, on Warren McCulloch and His Circle.
“Distinguishing Virtue Epistemology and Extended Cognition”, (2012) Invited contribution to Philosophical Explorations, 15, pp. 91-107. Special Issue on “Extended Cognition and Epistemology,” edited by Andy Clark, Duncan Pritchard, and Krist Vaesen.
Connectionism. In Oxford Bibliographies Online: Philosophy. Pritchard, Duncan (ed.) New York, NY: Oxford University Press. Article launched June 29, 2011. (Revised edition, 2016)
The Autonomy of Psychology in the Age of Neuroscience (with Carl Gillett). (2011). In Illari, P.M., Russo, F., and Williamson, J. (eds.) Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press. (pp. 202-23).
The Value of Cognitivism in Thinking about Extended Cognition. (2010). Special Issue of Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 9 (4), 579-603.
Computation in Cognitive Science: It is not all about Turing-equivalent computation. (2010). Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 41, 227–236. Invited contribution to a special issue on computation and cognitive science.
The Coupling-Constitution Fallacy Revisited, (2010), Invited Contribution to a Special Issue of Cognitive Systems Research, 11, (4), 332-342, on extended mind, edited by Leslie Marsh.
Consciousness: Don't Give up on the Brain (2010). In Pierfrancesco, B., Kiverstein, J., & Phemister, P. (Eds.) The Metaphysics of Consciousness: Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement, 67. (pp. 263-284).
The Boundaries Still Stand: A Reply to Fisher (2010). Journal of Mind & Behavior, 31 (1&2), 37-47.
Defending the Bounds of Cognition (with Fred Adams). (2010). In Menary, R., (Ed.). The Extended Mind, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (pp. 67-89). Submission invited by Richard Menary. Andy Clark has written a reply to this paper for this collection.
Causal Theories of Mental Content, (with Fred Adams), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (2010)
Levels, Individual Variation, Massive Multiple Realization in Neurobiology (with Carl Gillett) (2009) Bickle, J. (Ed.) Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Neuroscience. (pp. 539-581).
Embodied cognition and the extended mind. (with Fred Adams). (2009). In Garzon, P., & Symons, J. Routledge Companion to the Philosophy of Psychology. New York, NY: Routledge (pp. 193-213).
The (Multiple) Realization of Psychological and Other Properties in the Sciences. (with Carl Gillett). (2009). Mind & Language, 24, 181-208.
Neuroscience and Multiple Realization: A Reply to Bechtel and Mundale (2009), Synthese, 167, 493-510.
Editor's Introduction for Synthese. Special Issue on Philosophy and Neuroscience. (2009). Synthese, 167, 433-438.
Why the Mind is Still in the Head. (with Fred Adams) (2009). In Robbins, P., and Aydede, M. (Eds.). Cambridge Handbook on Situated Cognition. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. (pp. 78-95) .
Warren Sturgis McCulloch (2008). In N. Koertge (Ed.) New Dictionary of Scientific Biography, Volume 1. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, pp. 406-409.
Korbinian Brodmann (2008). In N. Koertge (Ed.) New Dictionary of Scientific Biography, Volume 5. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, pp. 76-9.
Walter Pitts and “A Logical Calculus” (with Mark Schlatter) (2007). Synthese, 162, 235-250.
Understanding the Embodiment of Perception. (2007). Journal of Philosophy, 104, 5-25.
The Biochemistry of Memory Consolidation: Model Systems for the Philosophy of Mind (2007) Synthese, 155, 65-98.
Understanding the Embodiment of Perception. APA Proceedings and Addresses 79 (3):5-25 (2006).
Defending Non-Derived Content (2005) (with Fred Adams). Philosophical Psychology, 18, 661-669.
Cognitive Architecture: The Structure of Cognitive Representations. (2003). Warfield, T., and Stich, S., Blackwell’s Companion to the Mind. pp. 172-189.
The Bounds of Cognition (2001) (with Fred Adams). Philosophical Psychology, 14, 43-64.
"Die Grenzen Der Kognition.” In: Philosophie der Verkörperung. Edited by Joerg Fingerhut, Rebekka Hufendiek and Markus Wild. Translated by Sophia Pick and Beate Suttterlüty. Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2013, pp. 224-259.
Connectionist Rules: A Rejoinder to Horgan and Tienson's Connectionism and the Philosophy of Psychology. Acta Analytica, 22, 59-85. (1999).
Rock Beats Scissors: Historicalism Fights Back. (1997) (with Fred Adams). Analysis, 57, 273-281.
Fodor’s Asymmetric Causal Dependency Theory and Proximal Projections. (1997) (with Fred Adams) Southern Journal of Philosophy, 35, 433-437.
Explaining Systematicity. (1997). Mind and Language, 12, 115-136.
Exhibiting versus Explaining Systematicity: A Reply to Hadley and Hayward, Minds and Machines, 7, 39-55. (1997).
The Role of the Systematicity Argument in Classicism and Connectionism. In O'Nuallain, S. (Ed.). Two Sciences of Mind: Readings in Cognitive Science and Consciousness. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: John Benjamins. (pp. 197-218). (1997).
The Gap between Science and Social Policy in The Bell Curve. American Behavioral Scientist, 39, 84-97. A special issue on “The Bell Curve: Laying bare the resurgence of scientific racism,” edited by Robert Newby. (1995).
Some Neural Network Theorizing Before McCulloch: Nicolas Rashevsky's Mathematical Biophysics. In Mira-Mira, J., (Ed.). Proceedings of the International Conference on Brain Processes, Theories, and Models. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (pp. 64-70). (1995).
Representations without Rules, Connectionism, and the Syntactic Argument. Synthese, 101, 465-492. (1994).
Lloyd's Dialectical Theory of Reference. Mind & Language, 9, 1-24. (1994).
Fodorian Semantics. (with Fred Adams) In Warfield, T., & Stich, S. (Eds.). Mental Representation: A Reader. (1994). Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. (pp. 223-242).
“X” means X: Fodor/Warfield Semantics. (with Fred Adams) Minds and Machines, 4, 215-231. (1994).
Fodorian Semantics, Pathologies, and Block's Problem. (with Fred Adams) Minds and Machines 3, 97-104. (1993).
Connectionism and Artificial Intelligence: History and Philosophical Interpretation. Journal for Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 4, 295-313. (1992). Reprinted in Ronald Chrisly (Ed.), Artificial Intelligence: Critical Concepts in Cognitive Science, vol. 2. London: Routledge/Taylor & Francis. December 2000.
'X' means X: Semantics Fodor-Style. (with Fred Adams) Minds and Machines, 2, 175-183. (1992).
Cognitive Science. In Fred Adams and Leemon McHenry, Reflections on Philosophy. St. Martins Press. (1992). (pp. 187-204).
Rules in Programming Languages and Networks. (with Fred Adams and Gary Fuller) In J. Dinsmore (Ed.). The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. (1992). (pp. 49-67).
Biology and Sufficiency in Connectionist Theory. In J. Dinsmore (Ed.) The Symbolic and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Hillsdale, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. (1992). (pp. 69-88).
Rules in Connectionism and Computationalism. (with Fred Adams and Gary Fuller) Proceedings of the Third Midwest Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science Society Conference, April 12-14, 1991. (pp. 6-10).
Dreyfus and Dreyfus on the History of Connectionism. Proceedings of the Third Midwest Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science Society Conference, April 12-14, 1991. (pp. 1-5).
Rules in Connectionism and Computationalism. (with Fred Adams and Gary Fuller) Proceedings of the 24th Hawaii International Conference on Systems Science, vol. 3. 1991. (pp. 359-367).
Unreduced Mechanisms in Neural Network Theory. Proceedings of the Second Midwest Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science Society Conference, March 30 - April 1, 1990. (pp. 1-7).